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GLOBALIZATION AND GENOCIDALISM: 
Fictional Discourse Without Borders  
(For Fun and Profit) 
 
In this essay we explore the relationship between globalization and genocidalism. 
“Globalization” is understood as “freedom and ability of individuals and firms to initiate 
voluntary economic transactions with residents of other countries,” while “genocidalism” 
is defined as “(i) the purposeful neglect to attribute responsibility for genocide in cases 
when overwhelming evidence exists, and as (ii) the energetic attributions of “genocide” in 
less then clear cases without considering available and convincing opposing evidence and 
argumentation.”  
The hypothesis that we defend here as explanatory of globalization’s “surprising” 
failure to live up to its often repeated theoretical promise that it is not a “zero-sum game,” 
is that this apparent failure is a result of the impact of the sole super-power’s global 
politics. These policies are manifested through an open onslaught on the notion of state 
sovereignty (impacting the sovereignty of virtually all countries except that of the U.S.), 
and an aggressive promotion of all kinds of interventionism, in particular armed (“hu-
manitarian”) intervention. The nexus between the two is to a significant degree provided by 
the social phenomenon (characteristic only of the West, since, for example, Mozambique 
does not go on talking about alleged genocide in, say, Northern Ireland) we call “geno-
cidalism”. Genocidalism manifests itself as a tool of globalization that is ever more morph-
ing into a sort of imperialism and neo-colonialism, and is indeed becoming something of a 
remarkably effective judicial Trojan horse. 
It looks to us that globalization is the globalization of US sovereignty, i.e., its 
extension over as much foreign territory as possible. Interestingly, genocidalism is a means 
to that end, and one that is more effective than, say, weapons of mass destruction, or even 
“terrorism” as a tool. Genocidalism is so effective that it bars the inherent right to self-
defense against aggression, and obviates the sovereignty of the targeted state. Genocid-
alism can even be employed to actually make states vanish, in what can only be called 
republicide. Such was the fate of Yugoslavia. The other historical example we use to illust-
rate our points consist of the events in Rwanda of 1994. 
KEY WORDS: Globalization, genocide, genocidalism, aggression, international law, 
criminal international tribunals, Yugoslavia, Rwanda. 
 
The hypothesis that we wish to propose as explanatory of globalization’s “sur-
prising” failure to live up to its often repeated theoretical promise that it is not a 
“zero-sum game,” is that this apparent failure is a result of the impact of the sole 
super-power’s global politics on the global economy. These policies are manifested 




through an open onslaught on the notion of state sovereignty (impacting the sove-
reignty of virtually all countries except that of the U.S.), and an aggressive promo-
tion of all kinds of interventionism, in particular armed (“humanitarian”) interven-
tion. The nexus between the two is to a significant degree provided by the social 
phenomenon (characteristic of the West) we call “genocidalism”. Genocidalism 
manifests itself as a tool of globalization (increased openness, or as we shall see, 
“openness,” and decreased state sovereignty) that is ever more morphing into a sort 
of imperialism and neo-colonialism, and is indeed becoming something of a 
remarkably effective judicial Trojan horse. 
 
1. Globalization 
We are urging that globalization and genocidalism be considered together. As 
the effects of globalization are not exclusively economic in nature, so, too, are 
genocidalism’s effects not restricted to the realm of sociology or academia. Both 
phenomena have real consequences—many of which are debilitating for vulnerable 
groups—and both heavily rely on a discourse of faith and belief, and seem imper-
vious to epistemological requirements, while portraying themselves, paradoxically, 
as highly serious, and essentially moral endeavors. In both cases, it appears that the 
intensity of the faith in the high morality of the actions carried out—towards 
foreigners, in foreign countries, and practically always, in the prevailing discourse, 
for foreign interests, and therefore not (or so little) in the interests of the practitio-
ners—insulates the practice from well-deserved scrutiny, and indeed, serious criti-
que.1   
Let us introduce the concept of genocidalism. “Genocidalism” is (stipulati-
vely) defined as follows: (i) The purposeful neglect to attribute responsibility for 
genocide in cases when overwhelming evidence exists, and as (ii) the energetic 
attributions of “genocide” in less then clear cases without considering available and 
convincing opposing evidence and argumentation. We may call the first manifest-
ation “genocidalism of omission,” while the second represents the genocidal use of 
the word “genocide” or “genocidalism of commission.”2 If we were to explore the 
relationship between the two manifestations of genocidalism we would find out 
that the latter often functions in the way that strengthens the former. Namely, the 
outcome of a genocidal use of “genocide” may lead to omission of attributing app-
ropriate responsibility for genocide in some related cases. However, in this paper 
we want to focus on clarifying as much as possible the connection between the 
genocidal use of “genocide” and the process of globalization. The former enables, 
justifies, and in some cases forcefully advocates various forms of intervention, 
––––––––––––– 
1 For an argument that in favor of such scrutiny in the form of constructing an ethics of 
international activism, see Aleksandar Jokic “Activism, Language, and International Law,” 
International Journal for the Semiotic of Law 15 (2002): 107-120. 
2 A detailed analysis of the concept of genocidalism and the associated social phenomenon 
is offered in Aleksandar Jokic, “Genocidalism,” The Journal of Ethics 8, No. 3 (2004): 251-297 




including military, while the latter can spread faster if all kinds of interventionism 
are maximally facilitated. 
Interestingly, genocidalism and globalization are co-occurring phenomena. 
Both are spreading at a faster pace in the post-Cold War period. However, while 
genocidalism is quintessentially a Western phenomenon (e.g., Mozambique does 
not go on talking about alleged genocide in, say, Northern Ireland) globalization in 
the economic sense of the word affects virtually all countries. Where genocidalism 
and globalization coincide is in their effect on diminishing sovereignty in general 
and that of weak and poor countries in particular.3 It is often argued, referring to 
international trade theory, that globalization is not a zero sum game; that is every-
one benefits from the spread of globalization. Also, openness and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) should theoretically make income distribution more equal in poor 
or less developed countries (LDS) and less equal in rich or developed countries 
(DC).4 The empirical figures show, however, that benefits are grossly unequally 
distributed: the rich and powerful benefit an enormous amount from the process 
while the weak and poor benefit (if at all) negligently by comparison (though these 
findings don’t go uncontested by economists who do research residing in the West-
ern world). The fact that genocidalism (as an instrument of globalization) appears 
to be a tool for weakening sovereignty, spreading interventionism, and increase of 
the obscene disparity in distribution of benefits globally, may fuel concerns, for 
many, that globalization is nothing more than simply neo-colonialism gone ram-
pant. 
The official World Bank definition of globalization is: “Freedom and ability of 
individuals and firms to initiate voluntary economic transactions with residents of 
other countries.” In real life globalization translates into greater mobility of the 
factors of production (capital and labor) and greater world integration through 
increased trade and foreign investments. The degree of mobility of labor and capi-
––––––––––––– 
3 This is why we would agree with the converse claim in Omar Dahbour “Three Models of 
Global Community,” The Journal of Ethics 9, no. 1-2 (2005): 201-24. Dahbour argues that only 
self-sustaining communities that embody some robust notion of sovereignty can adequately 
protect communities facing the threats posed by the globalizing tendencies of capital. 
4 For arguments and discussion of why, in theory, globalization should have the effect of 
bringing down the income inequality within the LCDs see, for example, Richard B. Freeman, 
“Are your Wages Set in Beijing?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 9 (Summer 1995), 
No.3, pp. 15-32; Adrian Wood, North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality: Changing 
Fortunes in a Skill-Driven World (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994); and Adrian Wood, “How 
trade Hurt Unskilled Workers,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 9 (Summer 1995), No. 
3, pp 57-80. Roughly, the theoretical reason for this expectation is as follows. The DCs have an 
advantage in skill-intensive products and tend to export these while LDCs tend to export low-
skill intensive products (because low-skill labor is their abundant factor and its price will 
therefore be low). Given the low price foreign investors will tend to invest in low-skill intensive 
processes. This should make income distribution in DCs more unequal while the income 
inequality in LDCs should go down. Empirical findings, however, do not reflect these theo-
retical expectations. 




tal depends on the openness of the countries around the globe (i.e., openness, while 
it often diminishes state sovereignty, is a necessary condition for this mobility, 
which is the essence of globalization). In fact, globalization is reflected in two 
variables: openness—share of combined exports and imports in GDP—and the 
share of FDI in GDP of the recipient country. In order for globalization, therefore, 
to be judged positively (to be called “globally good” in some meaningful way) we 
should be able to ascertain two facts from the perspective of LDCs: (i) the income 
inequality within the LDCs should go down, and (ii) the relationship between FDI 
and economic growth within the recipient country should be positive. Taken 
together the condition (i), which we may call “greater income equality principle,” 
and (ii), which we may call “FDI recipient positive growth principle” add up to 
something not unlike John Rawls’s second principle of his criterion of justice if 
attempted to be applied globally5: 
Second Principle: “Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two condi-
tions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under con-
ditions of fair equality of opportunity [the opportunity principle]; and second, they 
are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society [the 
difference principle]”6 
However, there is evidence, though still a matter of controversy, that neither of 
our conditions is satisfied. While, theoretically, the increased trade and foreign 
investment (openness) should make income distribution more equal in poor count-
ries and less equal in rich countries empirical findings prove otherwise. The 
evidence suggests that at very low average income level, it is the rich who benefit 
from openness. In fact, openness (combined share of exports and imports in count-
ry’s GDP) in very poor countries might increase inequality by helping those with 
basic education, and leaving even further behind those with no education.7 Thus, 
the effect of globalization (openness) on a country’s income distribution depends 
on country’s initial income level; that is, before income level rises for many LDCs 
openness cannot translate into a more equitable income distribution. But, how will 
the increase in income level be achieved? Perhaps it can increase through FDI? 
So what is the relationship between FDI and economic growth? As with the 
impact of openness on income distribution the answer to this question remains con-
troversial, though the question has received a great deal of attention from econo-
––––––––––––– 
5 We are hereby not suggesting that this should be done. In fact, we find objectionable the 
pet project of conceptualizing global economic justice, often carried out in terms of some notion 
of “human rights,” that is so dear to many upholders of “cosmopolitanism.”  See, for example, 
Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1979); Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Ian 
Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer (eds.), Global Justice (New York: New York University Press, 
1999); Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human rights (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); and 
Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (New Haven: Yale University Pres, 2002). 
6 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press 1993), p. 6. 
7 See again Wood (1994). 




mists in recent decades. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is described by the World 
Bank as “investment made to acquire a lasting management interest in an enterprise 
operating in a country other than that of the investor.” Typically, FDIs are made by 
large multinational corporations through mergers or acquisition, or through the 
construction of a new facility. There is no question that since the debtors’ crisis of 
the early 1980s, when a number of developing countries defaulted on their loans, 
FDI became a popular (and more apparently viable) option through which LDCs 
could attract capital through policies and incentives such as tax breaks. But what 
does increase in FDI mean for a country’s growth? If it doesn’t mean much, that is, 
if FDI has no effect on growth in the recipient countries or FDI clearly benefits 
only the country from which FDI originates, then there is no justifiable reason spe-
cific government policies should aim to attract FDI as a source of capital for LDCs. 
Let us not underestimate the impact of FDI in the last two decades when FDI has 
become the largest capital flow to LDCs, surpassing by far portfolio equity invest-
ment, private loans, and official “development assistance”.8 But who benefits? 
Economists are all over on this one in their interpretation of data; while some see 
the data as indicating that FDI is a significant factor in economic growth9 others 
find that FDI benefits the country from which FDI originates, not the recipient 
country10. Given the nature of the agents that are the primary sources of FDI, na-
mely the multinational companies, we would not be surprised that the latter is in 
fact the case. Be that as it may, we cannot here ascertain that there is positive rela-
tionship between FDI and economic growth within the recipient country. There-
fore, our condition (ii) isn’t satisfied either. 
We have observed here a surprising double failure. Neither is it the case, under 
the conditions of rapidly expanding globalization (openness) that (i) the income 
inequality within the LDCs goes down, nor that (ii) the relationship between FDI 
and economic growth within the recipient country is positive. This is surprising 
given, on the one hand, the theory based expectation that greater openness should 
foster more equitable income distribution in LDCs, and given the practice of go-
vernments in LDCs actively courting FDI through tax and other incentives, on the 
other. Assuming that it stands to reason that empirical data should really be in line 
with theoretical expectation and specific governments’ practices we may want to 
ask what could be the factors that are responsible for thwarting these natural theo-
retical expectations and governmental practices. This is where we come to our 
––––––––––––– 
8 See Dwight Perkins, Economics of Development (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2001); and World Bank, Global Development Finance  (Washington, D. C.: World Bank, 2002). 
9 See for example, De Gregorio E. Borensztein, J. and J-W. Lee, “How Does Foreign 
Direct Investment Affect Economic Growth?” Journal of International Economics 45 (1998), 
115-135. 
10 De la Potterie B. Van Pottellsberghe, “Does Foreign Direct Investment Transfer Techno-
logy Across Borders?” Review of Economics and Statistics 83 (2001), 490-497. 




second topic in this paper: genocidalism.11  
2. Genocidalism 
2.1 Genocidalism as a social phenomenon 
The genocidal use of “genocide” is a more widespread phenomenon in the 
contemporary discourse on international affairs than one might initially think. The 
parties guilty of genocidalism can be found in a broad range of partakers in this 
discourse among journalists, human rights activists, celebrities, politicians, interna-
tional law experts, and other academics such as psychologists, historians or poli-
tical scientists. While genocide is undoubtedly the highest crime of which humans 
are capable, quite a bit of harm can be achieved by morally irresponsible uses of 
the word “genocide”.  
In this respect perhaps the saddest and possibly most dangerous form of geno-
cidalist activity resides in (what poses as) academic scholarship. For, academics are 
by way of their training uniquely positioned to provide credence to this malignant 
intellectual attitude and pursuits that genocidalism represents. Academics have the 
skills and prestige needed to successfully package propaganda to appear as scho-
larship, emotions as good reasons, dogmatic belief as well supported claims, and 
prejudice, bigotry, and even racism as respectable viewpoints. They can turn lies 
into truth (or “truth”), fiction into fact, sick imagination into historical events, total 
ideological blindness into insights of a visionary, and, last but not least, they can 
turn apologia into veritable art form. However, academics are just one group in the 
larger community of genocidalism peddlers. In fact, in order for it to be effective 
this practice cannot be done in isolation. We must, therefore, learn to appreciate the 
importance of the point that in order for genocidalism to manifest itself as a social 
force, and inflict real damage on its targets, a relatively tightly knit network of 
players supporting each other’s endeavors is needed. 
2.2 Genocidalism as a deliberate epistemic failure 
The key to understanding genocidalism—and indeed, many other forms of 
fanaticism—is the identification of an inherent ingredient of the discourse, that 
may be called the attitude of ideologically based epistemic arrogance (for short, 
ideological arrogance). This epistemic failure, while easy to detect and reject when 
––––––––––––– 
11 This essay is a result of extensive revision and substantial expansion of the article by 
Aleksandar Jokic “Globalizing World and Genocidalism” prepared for the 8th International 
Roundtables for the Semiotics of Law: “Signs of the World: Interculturality and Globalization,” 
held in Lyon, France, non July 7-12, 2004. This coauthored assay also draws, in section 2, on 
Aleksandar Jokic, “Genocidalism” The Journal of Ethics 8 (2004), pp.251-297; and, in section 
3.3, in part on Tiphaine Dickson and Aleksandar Jokic, “Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No 
Evil: The Unsightly Milosevic Case” forthcoming in the International Journal for the Semiotics 
of Law Vol. 19 (2006). 




analyzing issues at home, seems to function with effortless impunity when it is 
applied to events abroad. Foreign markets, in particular in poor or developing 
regions of the world, attract predatory financial and economic practices; similarly, 
in the marketplace of ideas, these far-flung locales are the frequent settings for 
bafflingly effective displays of mendacity and contortions of logic. We shall intro-
duce this phenomenon by way of an example. 
Consider a report entitled “Journalist admits lying to the viewers” published by 
a web-based news outlet theaustralian.news.com on February 28, 2002. The story 
is about a veteran 60 Minutes reporter, Richard Carleton, who admitted he had 
misled, and lied to viewers by showing footage from another massacre site to 
illustrate a story about the alleged massacre of Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina. Despite this admission, however, Mr. Carleton denied he had behaved unethi-
cally as a journalist and said, “the footage had enhanced viewers’ understanding of 
the 1995 massacre of Muslim residents by Bosnian Serbs.” One may wonder at this 
point how lies can serve the purpose of enhancing anybody’s understanding of 
anything. But more importantly, we could ask what exactly is this understanding? 
It is the conviction that one “got it right,” and in this case it is Mr. Carleton’s con-
viction that the Serbs are the villains as far as the conflict in Bosnia and Herze-
govina was concerned, and spreading that conviction by any means possible must 
be just fine. The Carleton-like attitude that the job is “enhancement of understand-
ing” or “education of the audience” that is accompanied with utter disregard for 
true representation fails the epistemic reliability requirement for owing respect to a 
position held by such persons.12 All we have here is evidence that a journalist has 
taken the role of advocating in favor of a side in a conflict, we do not even know 
whether he sincerely believes the position he has chosen to proliferate, and we see 
preparedness to use any means possible to accomplish this. So, we may wonder, 
why stop there? Why not fully engage the whole spectrum of one’s own imagina-
tion and play it out,13 particularly if there is not only no cost to oneself but even 
prospects for (professional) glory.14 
––––––––––––– 
12 On the subject of respect for a person’s views see Edward Langerak, “Disagreement: 
Appreciating the Dark Side of Tolerance,” in Philosophy, Religion, and the Question of Into-
lerance, Mehdi Amin Razavi and David Ambuel (eds.) (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1997), see particularly pages 118-20. 
13 And, sure enough, as far as the Serbs’ “crimes” go, imagine they did. Witness, for 
instance, the German defense minister Rudolf Scharping at work on 16 April, 1999: “it is re-
counted that the fetus was cut out of the body of a dead pregnant woman in order to roast it and 
then put it back in the cut-open belly…that limbs and heads are systematically cut off, that 
sometimes they play football with heads…” Quoted in Diana Johnstone, Fool’s Crusade: Yugo-
slavia, NATO and Western Delusions (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2002), p. 252. But 
there was no material evidence, then or now, for stories of this sort. 
14 Consider, for example, Roy Gutman (Newsday reporter) the author of many excellent 
examples of this sort of narrative including A Witness to Genocide that not only got him a 
Pulitzer Prize, but also landed him a pseudo-governmental job as Senior Fellow at the U.S. 
Institute of Peace. And there were others, John Burns (New York Times), David Rohde (Chris-




Those engaged in the genocidalism of commission are on a similar mission of 
proliferating blame for genocide through “education,” and cannot afford to be 
choosy as to what they will present as evidence in their exciting endeavor to 
“enhance understanding” about what “really” transpired in some far away place. 
So, the question arises about what is the proper way to present historical episodes 
of genocide.  
2.3 Avoiding genocidalism by presenting  
all dimensions of a genocide 
When it comes to determining what would count as a proper discourse about 
an episode of alleged genocide one must pay attention to all four dimensions of 
genocide:  
(i) Historical time and place of the pertinent events;  
(ii) Perpetrators;  
(iii) Victims; and  
(iv) The number of people killed. 
There is an ambiguity here in the notion of “number” invoked in the dimension 
(iv). The number may mean the absolute number of people killed in an episode of 
genocide; it may mean a percentage of the population lost as part of the total 
number of people prior to the episode; or it may indicate the number that was 
deemed sufficient to endanger collective survival of a group. The last notion, if 
sufficiently fine-grained, and taking into account genocidal intent, should prove 
most relevant for determinations of whether genocide occurred in the context of a 
violent episode. So, such difficult questions would have to be entertained concern-
ing whether a loss of, say, 20% of pre-war population is equally bad for a nation of 
hundred million or for a nation of just seven million. What about a much smaller 
percentage and absolute number of killed for a population that has become signifi-
cantly impaired in the prospects of long-term survival? Since genocide—in its 
broadly understood meaning, synonymous with extermination—is accomplished 
and absolutely clear only when 100% of a given population is killed everything 
else is attempted genocide, the question arises, “At what point can this attempt be 
said to start?” These and similar vexing questions aside, what is clear is that the 
number of people killed in a violent episode—whatever its proper understanding—
represents a very important dimension of genocide.  
This dimension is crucially important not only for the purpose of appreciating 
the impact of genocide as a practice, but also when it comes to understanding what 
genocide really is, as well as for discerning where genocidalism of commission 
goes wrong. Namely, without giving proper attention to this fourth dimension of 
––––––––––––– 
tian Science Monitor), and most recently Samantha Power [A Problem from Hell: America and 
the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002)] got the Pulitzer for their works similarly 
premised.  




genocide any claim that genocide took place in some social context amounts to 
unequivocally attributing a specific intention to a group (or individual) on insuffi-
cient grounds, and constitutes irresponsible use of language. Furthermore, it stands 
to reason that the ratio of people killed among those who count as victims, and 
those who count as perpetrators in an episode of genocide must be such that the 
former considerably outnumber the latter. (Without this one-sidedness we would 
have an entirely new category of “crime,” which we may even call “mutual geno-
cide,” however, it would be one with its own, very different, logic of normative 
assessment than what we encounter when we consider genocide.) Of course, we 
face again a similar puzzle over what should count as  “considerable” in this con-
text. We can take it as clear, however, that if the sides in a conflict suffer roughly 
the same casualties, or the side that counts perpetrators suffers more killed than the 
side that counts as victims in a pronounced episode of “genocide,” then this 
criterion for genocide is not met and in the former case there cannot be talk of any 
victims of genocide on one side while on the other there are the perpetrators while 
obviously something has gone terribly wrong in the latter case.15 
Let us consider on two examples (that we will come back to again later)—
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda—of how things, indeed, can go terribly wrong. 
The standard figure that was widely used in the 1990s discourse on casualties 
regarding the conflict in the former Yugoslav Socialist Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was the number of 200,000 Bosnian Muslim victims. However, the 
only thorough study available in the 1990s suggests the range of 25,000 to 60,000 
fatalities on all sides to the conflict.16 Robert Hayden makes an interesting point 
about fatalities in Bosnia. He cites the estimates by “Bosnia’s State Health Protect-
ion Office,” an organ of Bosnian Muslim government, that 278,000 people were 
killed or went missing in the period 1992-95: 140,800 Bosniaks (that is Muslims), 
97,300 Serbs, and 28,400 Croats. If we took these numbers as the correct estimates 
of the fatalities Hayden calculates that this would mean that the “ratio of casualties 
to the prewar populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina of Muslims and Serbs are 
almost the same: 7.4 percent of Muslims, 7.1 percent of Serbs.” He concludes, 
rightly in our opinion: “This similarity of ratios would make it very hard to argue 
that what took place in Bosnia was “genocide,” unless there were two genocides 
there.” We take his invocation of “two genocides” as in fact a reductio ad absur-
dum of the claim that genocide took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 17  
––––––––––––– 
15 In Frank Chalk’s proposal for a redefinition of “genocide” the occurrence of the phrase 
“one-sided mass killing” suggests agreement with this insight. He defines genocide as “a form 
of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that 
group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator.” See Frank Chalk, “Redefining 
Genocide” in George Andreopoulos, Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), p. 52. 
16 See George Kenny, “The Bosnian Calculation,” New York Times, Sunday, 23 April 1995, 
Section 6, Magazine, p. 42. 
17 See Robert M. Hayden, “Shindler’s Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population 











All ethnic groups 
From 1990 à 1995 
 PERCENTAGE OF 
THE POPULATION 
KILLED 
Byumba    845.000   470.000 56 
Kigali 1.250.000   360.000 29 
Kibungo    700.000   349.000 50 
Butare    830.000   330.000 40 
Other prefectures 4.125.000   961.000 23 
All prefectures 7.750.000 2.470.000 32 
 
Things are much worse in the case of Rwanda. The standard figure given in 
the Western media about Rwanda is that some 800,000 Tutsi and “moderate Hutu” 
died at the hands of “extremist” Hutu. However, more serious studies of the 
distribution of casualties among conflicting groups during this episode of violence 
paint a very different picture.18 After assembling available data and testimonies, 
James K. Gasana19 estimates the number of victims of the Rwandan conflict (which 
began in October 1990, with a war of aggression carried out from Uganda by the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front, now in power) to close to 2.5 million, broken down as 
follows (seetable above).  
The total of 2, 470, 000 dead includes approximately 600, 000 Tutsi, killed by 
civilians, and common law criminals of all kinds.20 The difference (2, 470.000- 
––––––––––––– 
Transfers,” Slavic Review, 55 (1996), pp. 746-7, note 65. It is worth mentioning here another 
study commissioned by the Demographic Unit, Office of the Prosecutor International Criminal 
Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia, Ewa Tabeau and Jakub Bijak, “Casualties of the 1990s War 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Critique of Previous Estimates and the Latest Results,” European 
Journal of Population (forthcoming). This latest study further confirms the point we are 
advocating here by estimating the number of casualties to be the total of 102,622 persons, of 
which 55,261 were civilians and 47,360 militaries at the time of death. 
18 “Our research strongly suggests that a majority of the victims were Hutus - there weren't 
enough Tutsis in Rwanda at the time to account for all the reported deaths," Professor Davenport 
said, who worked with an associate, Allan Stam, from Dartmouth College.” See “Rwanda 1994 
killings weren't 'genocide': US study” as reported on March 4, 2004 by the Australian Broad-
casting Corporation at: 
 http://www.abc.net.au/cgi-bin/common/printfriendly.pl?http://www.abc.net.au/news/news-
items/s1080562.htm. 
19 James K Gasana, “La Violence politique au Rwanda 1991-1993,” (1998), Association 
NOUER, Geneva/Brussels, 1998. 
20 See “Genodynamics”, a study offered under the title “Mass Killing and the Oases of 
Humanity: Understanding Rwandan Genocide and Resistance,” available at:  
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/davenport/genodynamics/research.htm. 




600,000)= 1,870,000 represents Hutu victims of the conflict, many of whom were 
murdered by RPF combatants.  
These numbers suggest that the casualty rates between those who in the custo-
mary narratives count as victims and perpetrators are roughly equal in the case of 
the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina while, absurdly, the killed among the 
“perpetrators” outnumber by three times those of the “victims” in Rwanda. Yet, we 
continue to hear just the old numbers. The continued uncritical use of the old num-
bers about conflicts in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, clearly, represent an attem-
pt at a “nazification” of the Serbs and Hutu as peoples. But the real outcome, albeit 
perhaps unintended, may in fact be the “de-nazification” of the Nazi. What is more, 
however, to the extent that genocidalists through their narratives in effect “de-
Nazify” the Nazi, they in fact ultimately “Nazify” themselves!21 A cynic might 
observe that even in this day and age one can be essentially like a Nazi and enjoy 
it, but only when the ideological targeting is properly directed under the cover of 
geopolitically guided “political correctness.” 
 
3. International Criminal Law and Genocidalism 
3.1 Genocide 
According to Article II of the Genocide Convention, “genocide means any of 
the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
 (a) Killing members of the group; 
 (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” 
Consequently, for a situation to fit the definition of genocide, three essential 
elements are necessary: (i) an identifiable national, ethnic, racial or religious group; 
(ii) the intent to destroy such a group in whole or in part (mens rea); and (iii) the 
commission of any of the listed acts, (a)-(e), in conjunction with the identifiable 
group (actus reus).  
For a situation to be considered an instance of genocide there is no minimum 
number of fatalities required. However, the intent to destroy a particular group in 
whole or in part is probably accessible epistemically only when intent is associated 
with mass crimes. Discussing whether the U.S. were guilty of genocide in Vietnam, 
Jean-Paul Sartre correctly points out that the Genocide Convention “was tacitly 
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21 This dialectic salto mortale is delightfully captured by Milan Brdar in his “Humanitarian 
Intervention and the (De)Nazification Thesis as a Functional Simulacrum,” in Aleksandar Jokic 
(ed.) Lessons of Kosovo: The Dangers of Humanitarian Intervention (Calgary: Broadview Press, 
2003), pp. 153-71. 




referring to memories which were still fresh,” that is to Adolf Hitler’s “proclaim-
ed…intent to exterminate the Jews.”22 Sartre asserted the obvious, that not all go-
vernments would be as stupid as Adolf Hitler’s and proclaim such intentions as to 
eliminate a people. The question then is, if the intent is not explicitly proclaimed 
how is it discovered? Our contention would be that this process of discovery would 
have something to do with the scale of killing and massive disproportion (one-
sidedness) of fatalities between the parties involved.  
 
3.2 The impossibility of the primacy of international  
law over domestic law 
Genocidalism can, and indeed does, pose the greatest danger when deployed in 
the legal arena. The consequences are real, as is arrest, “transfer,” detention, 
conviction, and the stigma attached to charges—even unproven—of genocide, 
whether against an individual, or against a collective. While it could be expected 
that subjection of a litigious issue to competing advocates to establish legal and 
factual truth23 would guarantee an objective and reliable process of discovery, this 
expectation is only valid if the legal process in which the question is examined is 
itself valid, that is, legally constituted, independent, impartial, and respectful of 
evidentiary and procedural norms. The Security Council of the United Nations has 
established two ad hoc bodies (in 1993 for the “former” Yugoslavia24, bearing the 
acronym ICTY, and in 1994 for Rwanda, known as the ICTR) to which it has 
afforded jurisdiction over the crime of genocide. Although we will not debate in 
detail here the legality of the Security Council’s resolution, there is one element 
that we think has great philosophical significance. It relates to the fact that while 
the Tribunals remain subordinate to the Security Council, their statutes provide 
them with primacy over national courts (including the authority to demand the 
surrender of the accused). There is a paradox here, and it comes out quite clearly 
when we generalize the question to “How is it possible that international law could 
have primacy over national or domestic law?” 
 A complaint, not uncommon any more, that a specific domestic law of some 
––––––––––––– 
22 Discovering intent is not an easy matter, as the discussion, extensive investigation, and 
analysis of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam shows. The so-called Russell Tribunal (the 
International War Crimes Tribunal), which conducted its “trial” in the 1966-1967 in Stockholm 
and Copenhagen, unanimously found the U.S. guilty of genocide in Vietnam. Others looked at 
governmental statements (which, of course, never contained any admission of genocidal intent), 
and even population statistics and health standards of the Vietnamese population, only to find 
the allegation of genocide “grotesque” [See Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam New York: 
Oxford University Press, (1978), pp. 301-04 (emphasis provided)]. 
23 See Susan Haack, “Truth, truths, “truth”, and “truths” in the law”, The Journal of Philo-
sophy, Science and Law, Volume 3, 2003. 
24 The ICTY asserted jurisdiction over alleged offences committed on Yugoslav territory—
namely, Kosovo, a province of Serbia—while Yugoslavia was not yet a “former” nation. 




country is inconsistent with international law (especially human rights law) is often 
taken to render that domestic law somehow invalid (or morally unjustifiable). This 
implies a view that might be expressed in the statement that international law, 
strictly speaking, enjoys a primacy over domestic law. What sense could be made 
of this? It follows that consistency with international law is a condition of validity 
for domestic laws. Now this idea is either plainly mistaken or in need of clarifi-
cation (in order to imply anything of real relevance in the world). It is mistaken in 
the sense that per assumption domestic law has a clear source of validity, which 
determines its relevance in a precise manner: it is a decision of some collective 
about its own matters. It is in need of clarification, however, in the sense that it is 
obscure how could something with a clear source of validity depend in any way on 
something that is not clear what it is or whether it even exists. Hence, the assump-
tion that the relevancy of domestic laws is conditional on their consistency with 
international law does not appear at all legally applicable.  
On the contrary, international law, whatever its final shape, must start from the 
assumption that all applicable (domestic) laws have their relevance; that they 
express certain social facts that are simply there. For, if the relevancy of specific 
domestic laws were to be measured by their consistency with international law (or 
whatever other supra-national basis), then this would be tantamount to treating all 
domestic laws as irrelevant. Conditionality of the binding force of domestic law on 
consistency with international law, which is something that cannot be known in 
advance, would mean a question mark for every domestic law whether it is institu-
tionally binding or not. Therefore, the enforcement of any domestic law may ex 
post facto turn out to be, strictly speaking, illegal activity. Thus, the primacy of 
international law, explicated along this lines, rendering it as the only law with 
relevancy would, of course, be quite undesirable and dangerous. We doubt, how-
ever, that it is even possible to express this view in a coherent way because it 
appears to be an absurdity. What is possible, however, is for a powerful state to 
take the doctrine of the primacy of international law “seriously” as a ground for 
pronouncing at will various laws in other countries as (domestically) non-binding. 
There is great practical danger in this doctrine, for he whose judgment of (in)con-
sistency counts, has the power over others. This same problem plagues the newly 
established International Criminal Court (ICC), for the court theoretically would 
take action only when national courts fail to fulfill their legal responsibilities. But 
who determines a domestic system’s “ineffectiveness”? 
 
3.3 Problems with the ICTY indicating that  
it dispenses genocidalism 
When Slobodan Milosevic was asked to plead to the indictment filed against 
him, after being whisked off to The Hague as a result of a transfer whose legality 
bore more resemblance to kidnapping for ransom than to extradition, his response 




to the ICTY Chamber was not the typical “Not guilty." Milosevic instead said: 
"That is not my problem, that is your problem.” 
And, indeed, the ICTY’s problem it became. When the prosecution rested its 
case after the resignation of the Trial Chamber’s President, Richard May, in spring 
2004, many in the media bemoaned the failure to prove genocide, and others were 
unimpressed by the picture of confusion left by weak witnesses, deflated in cross-
examination by a defendant who consistently stated the ICTY was not a legal, or 
judicial, institution. Voices rose to express increasingly strident concern that the 
trial was going off the rails. Expectations appeared not to have been met. 
As the defence approached, and Milosevic announced that he would secure the 
attendance of 1600 witnesses to support the case he announced he would make 
from the beginning—namely that the “Balkan Wars” had in fact been one war, 
against Yugoslavia, planned and carried out by Western powers, whose gruesome 
apotheosis was NATO’s 78-day bombing campaign in 1999—the ICTY’s most 
prestigious supporters zeroed in on the upcoming defence, arguing that Milosevic’s 
right to represent himself had been granted “long enough.” 
The media onslaught was, and remains, significant and raises an obvious 
question: what is it about the present stage of the hearings that requires such colle-
ctive effort to defeat? 
The consistent, apparently genocidalist offensive seemed triggered by fear, and 
not only challenged—and continues to challenge—the internationally mandated 
right to self-representation (and the resulting freedom to present a true defence), 
but was further calculated to prevent Milosevic from demonstrating the ICTY’s 
illegality, and functions. Genocide apparently trumps fairness, and in particular the 
rights of the accused, when the exercise of those rights challenges the genocide 
narrative. President Milosevic has indeed consistently argued that the ICTY serves 
up apologia for the destruction of Yugoslavia, provides justification for aggression, 
and rewrites history. Hence, the seemingly endless references, not to Milosevic’s 
health, but to his deleterious impact on the “Court’s reputation,” “credibility” and 
“legitimacy.” 
Writing in the pages of International Herald Tribune25, David Scheffer, former 
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues under former U.S. Secretary of State 
Albright, dehumanized Milosevic, and urged the ICTY to reassert its “authority” 
over him. Wrote Scheffer: “When he was the presiding judge, the late Richard May 
deftly handled Milosevic’s exercise of his right to self-representation by giving him 
enough leash every day to speak his mind and then jerking that leash when he 
overstepped his bounds.” The metaphor of “leash jerking” was powerfully deplo-
yed in light of the painfully recent Abu Ghraib prison atrocities in Iraq, immortal-
ized by the infamous photograph of Pfc. Lynndie England holding a naked human 
being on a leash. Was Scheffer urging the ICTY to become more like Abu Ghraib, 
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25 David Scheffer, "Enough of Milosevic’s Antics" International Herald Tribune, July 13, 
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but in the judicial, rather than military theatre of operations? Whatever his intent, 
in one important respect there is hardly any difference between the physical and 
metaphorical leash jerking: they are both firmly grounded in the most primitive 
racist or reifying attitudes toward their targets. And who exactly was the target of 
David Scheffer’s comments? It would appear to be only Mr. Milosevic who is thus 
rendered inhuman, but there is another, even more crucial objective: the ICTY’s 
judges and prosecutor are implicitly reminded here that they are mere tools (res) of 
the Empire, so they had better deliver. 
And what were the goods to be delivered by the ICTY? The process is sta-
ggeringly costly, so it follows that a conviction is necessary, and that “justice” 
mandates the gagging of Milosevic, who is: “charged with crimes of enormous 
gravity in the Balkans: genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. They 
scream out for accountability. The United Nations and its member states are 
expending large sums of money on these trials for the purpose of justice, not poli-
tical diatribes and meandering defences.” It is unclear whether this is a legal or 
political argument. It may be that Scheffer’s position—promoting a novel legal 
approach—is that since Milosevic has been charged with the most serious crimes 
of all, and that they “scream out for accountability,” this very fact ipso facto consti-
tutes proof beyond reasonable doubt of his actual guilt. For who could imagine that 
the ICTY might bring frivolous charges and indict a sitting President in the midst 
of a war of aggression against his country? Alternatively, Scheffer’s words might 
be expressing a direct political claim: “We paid for this, and we certainly did not 
pay for this man to jerk us around.”  
Scheffer advocates the imposition of counsel, to: “ensure the integrity of the 
process, which may be nearing a breaking point with the international community.” 
The impatience expressed on behalf of the phantom “international community” 
might in fact be just Scheffer’s own and those of his ilk, well connected to the 
establishment of the ICTY. In any event, the point is that the ICTY has no legal 
authority beyond the powers granted by the Security Council, and deemed legally 
valid by its own appeals chamber, i.e., itself. Hence, its authority “must be assert-
ed.” The very process, which is an abuse, must be protected from “a crippling 
abuse,” that is, from denunciation by Milosevic, and in particular his witnesses: “A 
massive criminal enterprise of this character deserves a long, carefully developed 
trial that inevitably will experience delays. That is the nature of the beast. But the 
time has arrived to reassert the court’s mandated authority and prevent a crippling 
abuse of the process by the likes of Slobodan Milosevic.” “Nature of the beast,” 
indeed. It is urgent that this be accomplished since the ICTY, as opposed to judicial 
bodies the world over, is a “limited engagement,” and is attempting to complete 
investigations, trials, and appeals before a Security Council-mandated deadline—
known as the “completion strategy”—in 2010. A conviction must be secured be-
fore then. Just as performances must end before the circus can leave town. 
Also urgent is that “Serbs,” specifically, “respect the court’s authority,” and 
presumably this transformation can only take place if Milosevic is gagged, and the 




illegality of the body never mentioned again: “Perhaps if the discipline of a 
competent counsel is brought into the courtroom, Milosevic’s Serb supporters 
would learn to respect the authority of this tribunal.” 
In his conclusion Scheffer fittingly returned, in true genocidalist form, to his 
tired leash metaphor to reinforce his point that Milosevic must be silenced 
“permanently” since he is inhuman: “Milosevic has jerked the court around long 
enough. It is time to permanently pull in Judge May’s well-worn leash.” 
And if Scheffer’s abuse of the genocide discourse to dehumanize a defendant 
and publicly lobby for the violation of human rights wasn’t enough of an illust-
ration of the impunity afforded to genocidalism in the legal arena, Michael Scharf, 
visiting professor of law at Case Western Reserve University, and instrumental in 
the creation of the ICTY, followed Scheffer’s opening salvo in the Washington 
Post, and, with bone-chilling clarity, made the case for imposition, employing 
strikingly political arguments.26 Drawing on the now-familiar refrain that Slobodan 
Milosevic is “playing for the home audience,” Scharf was outraged by the idea that 
the unrepresented defendant would somehow make use of a show trial to gain 
support in Serbia and Montenegro, when the ICTY was created, he deadpanned, 
precisely to remove Milosevic from politics, and “educate” Serbs, so that he and 
his like would be put out of commission forever. That his own argument confirms 
the political nature of the ICTY and candidly clarifies its objectives as non-judicial 
does not deter Scharf from the description of the process as an “international war 
crimes trial” and the institution as a “court of law.” 
According to Scharf: “Milosevic’s caustic defence strategy is unlikely to win 
him acquittal, but it isn’t aimed at the court of law in The Hague. His audience is 
the court of public opinion back home in Serbia, where the trial is a top-rated TV 
show and Milosevic’s standing continues to rise. Opinion polls have reported that 
75 percent of Serbs do not feel that Milosevic is getting a fair trial, and 67 percent 
think that he is not responsible for any war crimes. ‘Slobo Hero!’ graffiti is 
omnipresent on Belgrade buses and buildings. Last December, he easily won a seat 
in the Serbian parliament in a national election.” 
What any of these concerns and political trivia could possibly have to do with 
international law—if considered as an activity of a judicial nature—is unclear. If, 
however, playing to an uninformed Western public, the idea is to suggest that by 
granting basic internationally recognized human rights to the man who was the 
West’s principal interlocutor in Balkan peace negotiations for over half a decade, 
the ICTY is failing in its mission to “educate” the Serbs, then the point is well 
taken. Scharf deplores the fact that opinion polls show that “75% of Serbs do not 
feel Milosevic is getting a fair trial.” Scharf’s disappointment in this expression of 
popular distrust—which may well be directed to the institution as a whole—assu-
mes that public opinion in Serbia and Montenegro is misguided, and that it fails to 
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appreciate the “fairness” of the proceedings. But if, as Scharf claims, ICTY hear-
ings are “top rated” TV shows, then public opinion was formed by actually obser-
ving the proceedings; in which case the problem might not be collective delusion 
abroad, but rather Western ignorance of the ICTY’s day to day workings. The latter 
are largely inconsistent with the widely held Western belief—based, perhaps, on 
faith or missionary zeal—that proceedings in The Hague are inherently fair. 
Scharf’s preoccupation with graffiti adorning the buses and buildings of 
Belgrade is perhaps an expression of concern for the environment. However, any 
threat posed by ‘Slobo Hero!’ pales in comparison to the effects of NATO’s 
bombing, and in particular, with the presence of depleted uranium in the soil and 
groundwater of Serbia and Montenegro. It may be that “Serb” public opinion has 
not yet been sufficiently educated by the “court of law” to lose sight of this distur-
bing reality, which will remain with it for decades, and possibly centuries. Perhaps 
this reality and the ever-present reminders of NATO’s bombing in the streets of 
Belgrade have had some influence on the public perception of the ICTY’s “fair-
ness.”27 Or perhaps the massive privatizations forced upon Serbia and Montenegro, 
as well as the sudden staggering increase in unemployment and the impoverish-
ments that came in the wake of the nation’s new, post-Yugoslav “openness,” fail to 
inspire the majority of people struggling for survival, with global anything, much 
less “global justice,” which after all, was largely responsible for triggering the first 
aerial bombing of Belgrade since World War II.  
In an eloquent illustration of how the genocidalist discourse permits dizzying 
contortions of logic, all justified (or promoted) by some article of faith, Scharf 
makes plain that the ICTY was created for political reasons, yet advocates 
imposing counsel on Slobodan Milosevic to prevent him from making precisely the 
same point. The only difference is that Milosevic is “disparaging,” while Scharf 
argues that the ICTY’s evident political objectives are somehow valid: 
“In creating the Yugoslavia tribunal statute, the U.N. Security Council set three 
objectives: first, to educate the Serbian people, who were long misled by Milosevic’s 
propaganda, about the acts of aggression, war crimes and crimes against humanity 
committed by his regime; second, to facilitate national reconciliation by pinning prime 
responsibility on Milosevic and other top leaders and disclosing the ways in which the 
Milosevic regime had induced ordinary Serbs to commit atrocities; and third, to 
promote political catharsis while enabling Serbia’s newly elected leaders to distance 
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Passenger trains were struck by so-called smart bombs, as was the RTS public television station, 
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a naked assassination attempt in complete violation of international law. 




themselves from the repressive policies of the past. May’s decision to allow Milosevic 
to represent himself has seriously undercut these aims.” 
The idea that affording the right of self-representation to Milosevic had 
“seriously undercut” the “aims” of the ICTY’s very establishment strains credulity. 
However, if those aims were, and continue to be, “to pin” responsibility on Slobo-
dan Milosevic, and to “educate” Serbs about how bad he was—or, ultimately, how 
bad Yugoslavia was—then these aims are assuredly not shared by the defendant. 
Indeed, Milosevic has no intention of assisting the ICTY in “convincing Serbs” 
that acts of aggression committed against Yugoslavia were justified. Furthermore, 
whether or not the political aims set out by Scharf are valid, morally correct, or 
politically expedient, they cannot make legal what is illegal, they cannot make 
legitimate what is illegitimate, and they cannot, most crucially, turn a political 
body into a court. 
 
3.4 Rwanda’s mind-numbing genocidalism,  
and selective jurisdiction 
While the massacres that took place in Rwanda from April to July, 1994 were 
undoubtedly a historical tragedy, little is known, it seems, of that nation’s war—a 
war of aggression—which began on October, 1990, when Rwanda was the object 
of an invasion from Uganda, by Ugandan officers, with Ugandan materiel and 
weapons, led by a commander being trained in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, preci-
sely at the moment the IMF was clamping down on the country’s developing eco-
nomy, and when the international coffee markets—Rwanda’s principal export—
were crashing28. A few months earlier, French President Mitterrand had stepped up 
the rhetoric of democratization, and demanded its francophone “partners” in Africa 
move towards multipartism29. Thus, a tiny, mostly rural nation, debilitated by the 
economic pressures of the promise of globalization, endured the horror of war, 
replete with nightmarish massacres of the civilian population30, until it entered into 
the Arusha Peace Accords, which were to install a “broad-based transitional 
government” and eventually see democratic, multiparty elections, with a UN 
peacekeeping force to help the nation along the path to peace and recovery. This 
force was UNAMIR, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda, whose 
force commander was Canadian general Romeo Dallaire, now a Carr Fellow at 
––––––––––––– 
28 See Michael Chossudovsky  “The US was Behind the Rwandan Genocide: Installing a 
US Protectorate in Central Africa,” at: http://www.globalreasearch.ca/articles/CHO305A.html. 
29 Barrie Collins “New Wars and Old Wars? The Lessons of Rwanda,” in David Chandler 
(ed.) Rethinking Human Rights : Critical Approaches to International Politics (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan 2003) 157—75. 
30 See testimony of Abdul Ruzibiza, a former RPF officer detailing the RPF’s crimes 
against the civilian population at: http://www.inshuti.org/ruzibiza.htm. 




Harvard, and an ardent advocate of intervention in the Darfur region of Sudan,31 
where he has proposed that “special units” could “eliminate or incarcerate” (in that 
order?) those “presumed responsible”32 for committing acts of genocide. Humani-
tarian intervention seems to have evolved from apparently indiscriminate aerial 
bombing (Yugoslavia) to good, old-fashioned death squads, and while the refine-
ment in technique should perhaps be welcomed, the utter lack of interest in whether 
genocide was or was not committed in Darfur before the “elimination” or “incar-
ceration” (in whatever order) take place really ought, putting it very mildly, give 
pause. But as we have seen, the genocide discourse hardly requires logic, and 
appears to shrug off epistemology as some boring, outdated requirement applicable 
only to academic eggheads and defense lawyers (if at all). 
On April 6th, 1994, the plane carrying the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi 
back from a peace conference in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, was shot down by two 
SAM-16 missiles on its approach to Grégoire Kayibanda International Airport, 
killing all aboard: the presidents of two countries barely maintaining a fragile 
peace, the chief of staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces, close advisors to the 
presidents, and a French crew. Any (perhaps delusional) idea of peace had instantly 
vanished, and as armed conflict resumed, the killings began. 
The shooting down of the President's plane, considered by all, including the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Rwanda33 the proximate cause of the massacres, had 
been under investigation several years ago, but it was shut down, personally, by 
then-Prosecutor, Louise Arbour, who is now High Commissioner for Human 
Rights of the United Nations.34 The ICTR investigation had revealed that those 
responsible for shooting down the plane were in fact those currently in power—the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front, led by Major-General Paul Kagame—with the assistance 
of a foreign country.35 And when defense counsel sought to obtain the results of 
those investigations, or attempted to ascertain whether they were even taking place, 
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32 Both ad hoc Security Council tribunals are, by their official titles, tribunals for the 
prosecution of those “presumed responsible” of grave violations of humanitarian law. Both, in 
an apparent paradox, guarantee the presumption of innocence. 
33 See report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr. R. Degni-Ségui, 
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, under paragraph 20 of Commission 
resolution E/CN.4/S-3/1 of 25 May 1994 available at: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/commiss-
ion/country51/7.htm. 
34 See Robin Philpot “Nobody Can Call It a ‘Plane Crash’ Now! Judge Bruguière's Report 
on the Assassination of former Rwandan President Habyarimana,” Counterpunch March 12/14, 
2004: http://www.counterpunch.org/philpot03122004.html. 
35 Steven Edwards “Explosive Leak on Rwanda Genocide,” National Post, (Toronto), 
March 1st, 2000, page 1. 




the Prosecution boldly claimed that there were none, nor were any required, as the 
ICTR had no interest, and indeed no jurisdiction, to investigate “plane crashes” or 
the deaths of “presidents or vice-presidents.”36 The investigation was terminated 
shortly after that motion was argued in the Rutaganda case.37 This is a fascinating 
illustration of genocidalism’s double standard, its moralité à géométrie variable38, 
as the practice is just as capable of retreating rapidly into disingenuous claims of 
“lack of jurisdiction” (when pretty serious crimes really ought to be investigated) 
as it is of quasi-tentacular reach into an ever-increasing number of conflicts39 and 
issues40 framed as genocide.    
According to the Nuremberg Tribunal, “To initiate a war of aggression is not 
only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only 
from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the 
whole.”41 Neither of the UN ad hoc Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia—crea-
ted without recourse to treaty, or to the General Assembly, and in blithe disregard 
for the UN Charter’s apparently platudinous orthodoxies of a bygone era, such as 
respect for national sovereignty and a Security Council limited to jurisdiction over 
peace and security, not international circuit courts—consider aggression within 
their jurisdiction. In fact, they provide cover and justification for wars of aggres-
sion and contribute to the creation of conditions that actually increase the incidence 
of crime (including crimes against Humanity and rape, for starters) such as war, 
lawlessness, dehumanization, and the immiseration of men, women and children. 
The ICTR does not consider the militarily victorious (with the help, perhaps, 
of the US, who succeeded in reducing the UN peacekeeping force to a symbolic 
presence42) RPF's 1996 invasion of the Congo—with reported massacres of tens of 
thousands of Hutu refugees and Congolese civilians43, nor Rwanda's bloody 1998 
reinvasion of Congo, which degenerated, at one point, into a war involving 8 
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37 Id. 
38 For an excellent analysis of this aspect of the phenomenon see Edward S. Herman “The 
Cruise Missile Left (Part 5): Samantha Power and the Genocide Gambit,” May 17, 2004 avail-
able at: http://musictravel.free.fr/political/political49.htm. 
39 See, for example, Gajendra K. Singh “New Bush Era Begins,” South Asian Analysis 
Group, paper no. 1174 available at: http://www.saag.org/papers12/paper1174.html. 
40 See, for example, Gregg Cunningham “Why Abortion is Genocide?” a publication of 
something called The Center for Bio-Ethical Reform available at: http://abortionno.org/Resour-
ces/abortion.html. 
41 Nuremberg Tribunal Judgment, (IMT, Goering et al.), 1946, p. 26. 
42 Michael Mandel, How America Gets Away With Murder: Illegal Wars, Collateral 
Damage, and Crimes Against Humanity, (London-Ann Arbor, Pluto Press, 2004) p. 105. 
43 Id: “America has provided military aid for the Rwanda regime’s participation since 1996 
in the Congo war, which has benefited so many North American mining interests and taken 
millions of lives.”  




African countries, and which has been responsible for the death of at least 5 million 
people, according to conservative sources such as the International Committee for 
Refugees.44 The ICTR instead greatly contributes to the justification of Rwandan 
aggression abroad (and repression at home) by consecrating a “victim” status for 
the current military leadership, and collectively demonizes the Hutu as “génoci-
daires”. 
Courts who consider the gravity of an offence based on the identity of the 
victim are not carrying out justice; they are promoting injustice as they create 
conditions of impunity for the crimes committed against the victims they exclude. 
Furthermore, can it be justice when the nature of actions depends on the identity of 
an alleged perpetrator? Accounts of Serb “rape camps” in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
are “genocidal”. Saddam’s “rape rooms” justify invasion and occupation. Yet rapes 
of boys, committed in front of their parents by US troops and private contractors at 
Abu Ghraib warrant impunity. It is fair to say that that is not justice, but a 
perversion of justice. 
During the September 30th US Presidential debate, George W. Bush stated that 
he would not join the International Criminal Court where “unaccountable judges 
and prosecutors can pull our troops or diplomats up for trial”45, adding that such a 
practice would be contrary to the national interest. It is obviously (to us, at least) 
not in anybody’s interest to be tried before unaccountable judges. But it would 
appear that it is in the US national interest that other people, lesser people, are thus 
prosecuted. 
The US national interest is in diminishing—eliminating ultimately—everyone 
else's national sovereignty. And one of the means to achieve that interest is by 
establishing these non-democratic Tribunals, and manipulating the concept of 
genocide to attain legitimacy. The Tribunals bully, coerce, and blackmail recal-
citrant nations with bogus indictments, and create instant versions of history to 
further destabilize its colonies. And the US interest is in securing impunity for 
itself, as well as its clients, for the crime of aggression, which is frequently requi-
red in the pursuit of its goal: the destruction of national sovereignty. Genocidalism, 
to paraphrase Michael Mandel (on the “punitive vision of international human 
rights”), looks a lot like “globalized American law-and-order politics, like music 
videos and jeans: what they used to call the ‘Coca-colonization’ of the world”.46 




44 On the “conservative” estimates of 5 million dead in Congo, it seems the International 
Refugee Committee has brought it down to 3.3 million:www.refintl.org/content/arti-
cle/detail971. 
45 See the debate transcript at: http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2004a.html. 
46 Mandel, p. 249. 




There are two results of our discussion that should be emphasized in the 
concluding remarks. The first result exposes what might be described as a huge 
normative divide between ways of attending to domestic (or national) concerns and 
ways of attending to international issues characteristic of Western democracies. 
Often what is clearly wrong, even criminalized on the domestic (national) level 
seems all right, even encouraged when it is practiced with respect to international 
affairs. The second outcome is the recognition that there exists a need for proper 
institutionalization of protection against harms (individual and collective) that ge-
nocidalism of commission inflicts on its targets. 
It looks to us that globalization is the globalization of US sovereignty, i.e., its 
extension over as much foreign territory as possible.  And genocidalism is a means 
to that end, more effective than, say, weapons of mass destruction, or even “terror-
ism” as a tool.47 Genocidalism is so effective that it bars the inherent right to self-
defense against aggression, and obviates the sovereignty of the targeted state. 
Genocidalism can even be employed to actually make states vanish, in what can 
only be called republicide. Genocidalism—so far, tragically—means never having 
to say you’re sorry. The claim simply sticks, no matter what, as fiction is elevated 
above truth in the public discourse, whether the general public discourse, the media 
discourse, the academic discourse, and increasingly, the judicial discourse. 
Determining the existence of facts  (in law) involves a certain methodology 
that increases the chances that what is being established will also be reliable and 
relevant. Fiction’s methodology is not even important, but its effect—the ability to 
create emotion, seems more appealing to more and more “thinkers” (who should 
logically be renamed “feelers”).48 When genocidalism is employed to advance fo-
reign policy aims, in particular territorial ones, the debunking of the genocide 
claim, while possible, is entirely ineffective, and in any event does not influence 
the “facts on the ground,” such as Camp Bondsteel in the occupied province of 
Serbia, Kosovo and Metohija, or NATO's continued presence in Bosnia and Herze-
govina. 
––––––––––––– 
47 However, when WMD fails, just use “democracy”—you're already occupying the 
country, so why not give the uncivilized some “democracy” for their troubles, and call it even? 
Even pretend to throw a bone to those on the Left-fake appeasement for the fake peace crowd–
and comfort their delusion that somehow they succeeded in their efforts to Bring Home the 
Troops, Now! and give Iraq the great democracy of America, which far too many of these 
people invoke as a reason America should just live up to its ideals and do more good-like 
President Clinton did for Sudan, Rwanda and Yugoslavia – and less evil – like Bush and 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and whoever is next on the target list. 
48 On this most alarming trend, it is interesting to note that the American Society for 
International Law published academic and State Department insider Michael Scharf’s reference 
to what an ICTY judge was “feeling” when he issued a decision. Jurists should be serious, and 
be interested in rules of evidence, but where genocide claims are involved, feelings appear to 
carry more weight. See, “ICTY Appeals Chamber Decision of Slobodan Milosevic's Right to 
Self Representation", November 2004; www.asil.org/2004/11/insight041111.html 




Although the act of genocide can be disproved, it is much more difficult to 
remove the feeling of Genocide, and therefore the necessity of intervention, and its 
subsequent justification.49 It may not be genocide, but it sure feels like it, therefore 
if (what I’m feeling) isn’t genocide, then I don’t know what is! And that creates a 
belief, unshakable, in a “reality,” although the holder of the belief might even know 
it to be factually false. So what! The genocidalists, now practically artists, seem to 
be having fun deploying their craft. If that is the case, then they are not morally 
better than the sociopaths who take pleasure in torturing their victims. 
This is why we believe that once the nature of genocidalism of commission is 
truly appreciated, that is, once it becomes a properly understood, and well-resear-
ched social phenomenon, it should become recognized as a criminal act. And the 
sentences should be very stiff indeed. 
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ГЛОБАЛИЗАЦИЈА И ГЕНОЦИДАЛИЗАМ: 
БЕЗГРАНИЧНИ ФИКЦИОНИ ДИСКУРС  
(ЗА ЗАБАВУ И ПРОФИТ) 
 
У овом есеју аутори истражују однос између глобализације и геноцидализма. 
“Глобализација” је схваћена као “слобода и способност индивидуа и фирми да ини-
цирају добровољне економске трансакције са становницима других земаља”, док 
“геноцидализам” дефинишу као “(i) сврховито занемаривање или приписивање одго-
ворности за геноцид у случајевима када постоји обимна евиденција; (ii) упорно 
приписивање “геноцида” у нејасним случајевима без узимања у обзир расположиве и 
уверљиве евиденције и аргументације. 
Аутори бране хипотезу да се напад на концепт суверенитета националне државе 
(свих држава изузев САД) и агресивна промоција интервенционизма, нарочито 
“хуманитарне” интервенције, може приписати утицају једино преостале суперсиле. О 
томе посебно сведочи друштвено-политички феномен “геноцидализма”. Овај се 
манифестује као оруђе глобализације која показује карактеристике империјализма и 
неоколонијализма а делује попут успешног Тројанског коња у правном смислу. 
У глобализацији је према ауторима реч о глобализованју суверенитета САД, то 
јест,реч је о њиховом ширењу на што више иностраних земаља. Геноцидализам је 
––––––––––––– 
49 Thus we can only agree with the claims in Dale Jamieson “Duties to the Distant: Aid, 
Assistance, and Intervention in the Developing World,” The Journal of Ethics 9, No. 1-2 (2005): 
151-71. Jamieson argues that “humanitarian” interventions (i.e., wars of aggression ostensibly 
“justified” in the name of protecting and promoting “human rights”) usually serve various 
imperial projects of the U.S. 




средство које служи у ту сврху а које је често успешније од оружја за масовно 
уништење и од “тероризма”. Генецодализам је успешан зато што се ослања на право 
самоодбране у чије име оспорава сувреренитет одређене земље. Он може да буде 
употребљен за унишзење читавих држава, као што је било у случају Југославије или 
Руанде. 
Кључне речи: глобализација, геноцид, геноцидализам, агресија, међународно 
право, међународни трибунал. Југославија, Рунада.  
